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THE EXTENT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
INTRODUCrION
The landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio' clarified the perplexing prob-
lem concerning the admissibility in criminal proceedings of evidence
illegally seized by state or federal officials. The Supreme Court held
that, "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." 2
This decision represented the conclusive step in a series of cases tending
toward this result.3
However, there are several problems remaining to be solved. These
questions stem from limitations that may be placed on the Mapp de-
cision. It can be argued that since the case was a criminal one, the
holding only applies to criminal cases. It may also be asserted that
the Fourteenth Amendment restricts the Fourth Amendment only to
state officials and not to private individuals.4 The split in authority over
the preceding statements raises two central issues: (1) One question
is whether evidence illegally seized by a state or federal official is ad-
missible in a civil case. (2) A more complex problem is whether evi-
dence wrongfully seized by a private individual should be admitted in
criminal or civil proceedings. This note will explore these problems
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Id. at 655.
3. The common law tradition was that the manner of obtaining evidence is not
cause for its suppression in a civil or criminal proceeding. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183.
This doctrine has been gradually altered. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886) (The Supreme Court first hinted at the exclusionary rule.); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (The exclusionary rule for criminal proceedings was initially
formulated.); Elkins v. United States, 345 U.S. 206 (1960) (Evidence seized illegally by
state officials was deemed inadmissible in criminal trials in federal courts.) See gen-
erally, Note, The Exclusionary Rule of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Its Development
and Application, 35 S. CAL. L.R. 64 (1961).
4. Since a discussion of whether or not evidence seized by an individual may be
seized illegally under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments will follow, the term
"wrongfully" or "unreasonably" seized will be substituted for "illegally" seized when
refering to a situation where a private individual has procured evidence in a manner that
would be illegal if he had been a state or federal official. It is first necessary to de-
termine whether individual action falls under the Fourth Amendment. If it is decided
that it does, the question remains whether the exclusionary rule is applicable or the
common law rule is still in effect. See generally, Note, Mapp v. Ohio and Exclusion of
Evidence Illegally Obtained by Private Parties, 72 YALE L.J. 1062 (1963); Comment,
A Comment on the Exclusion of Evidence Wrongfully Obtained by Private Individuals,
1966 UTAH L.R. 271 (1966).
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in order to determine to what extent the exclusionary rule can be applied
beyond the limited situation which was presented to the court in Mapp.
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY SEIZED
BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
The civil areas in which evidence seized by governmental officials,
state or federal, is used may be divided into tax cases, forfeiture cases,
and a miscellaneous category containing various other types of civil
proceedings.
Tax Proceedings
A current question in need of resolution is whether illegally seized
evidence on which civil tax liability is determined can be suppressed
under MappY
It is sometimes difficult to determine whether the court considers the
tax case civil or criminal. Where tax proceedings have been considered
criminal in nature the exclusionary rule has, of course, been held to be
applicable. The principal civil tax case excluding unlawfully obtained
evidence is Rogers v. United States.7 The First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that in an action to recover customs duties on liquors im-
ported into the United States the admissibility of evidence obtained
under a search warrant illegally issued was reversible error. Other
court decisions prior to Mapp indicate that these courts would also
exclude evidence from a civil tax suit if they deemed it to be illegally
seized."
Lassoff v. Gray9 probably best illustrates the trend of the law in tax
cases. In Lassoff it was found that evidence obtained as a result of an
unreasonable search and seizure of the taxpayer's premises was inad-
5. See generally, L.J., De Revil, Applicability of the Fourth Amendment in Civil
Cases, 1963 DuKE L.R. 472.
6. E.g., Lord v. Kelly, 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963) (Evidence obtained in an
unlawful seizure of tax records was held inadmissible and a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.); Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 230 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
7. 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938).
8. E.g., Jarecki v. Whetstone, 82 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1948) (Court recognized
Fourth Amendment applied where one is required to produce papers and records on
an Internal Revenue subpoena duces tecum.); Tovar v. Jarecki, 83 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.
IMI. 1948) (dictum) reed on other grounds, 173 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1949). (A tax as-
sessment based on evidence in unlawful search and seizure would be illegal, but here
the assessment was found to be based on other grounds.)
9. 207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
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missible to establish liability of the taxpayer for a wagering tax. How-
ever, the court held that this evidence could be used to impeach the
defendant's testimony.'0
As has been noted, tax cases while civil in form are usually criminal
in nature. It appears that the exclusionary rule will continue to be ap-
plied in both federal and state tax cases, although there are no state
court decisions to substantiate this proposition.
Forfeiture Proceedings
The exclusionary rule was first constructed during the forfeiture
proceeding of Boyd v. United States." Speaking for the majority, Mr.
Justice Bradley stated:
We are clearly of opinion that proceedings instituted for the
purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason
of offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in form
are in their nature criminal.'2
It would appear that it has been well settled that the exclusionary rule
does apply to forfeiture proceedings on two principles. First, the
Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to forfeiture proceedings
in Boyd. Second, a forfeiture case being criminal in nature would be
subjected to the exclusionary rule as expounded in Weeks v. United
States'3 and extended to the states by Mapp.
Nevertheless, the circuit courts were split on the question of
whether illegally seized evidence could be offered into evidence in for-
feiture proceedings. In Dodge v. United States4 it was held that the
jurisdiction of the court depended wholly upon whether the govern-
ment had possession of the res at the time of trial and the way in which
possession was acquired was irrelevant. The confusion resulted wher
one district court construed the Dodge case as standing for the propo-
sition that the exclusionary rule does not apply in forfeiture proceed-
ings."; Despite this decision most courts continued to rely on Boyd.1
10. Accord, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
11. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
12. Id. at 633-634.
13. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
14. 272 U.S. 530 (1926).
15. United v. One 1956 Ford Tudor Sedan, 185 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Ky. 1960).
16. E.g., United States v. Physic, 175 F.2d 338 (2d Cit. 1949); United States v. One
1946 Plymouth Sedan, 167 F.2d 3 (7th Cit. 1948); United States v. Butler, 156 F.2d
897 (loth Cir. 1946); United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Hardtop, 220 F. Supp. 841
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The decisive opinion in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania'7
settled the conflict in this area. The Supreme Court asserted that un-
lawfully seized evidence by state police is inadmissible in proceedings
for forfeiture of a car which had allegedly been used in illegal trans-
portation of liquors. This not only settled federal law on forfeiture,
but also through Mapp applied the exclusionary rule to state forfeiture
cases.
Other Civil Proceedings
There are cases other than tax and forfeiture proceedings that are
quasi-criminal in nature. The court in Leogrande v. State Liquor Au-
thority's held that the exclusionary rule extends to any official state or
federal proceeding brought to impose forfeitures, penalties, or similar
sanctions for violation of laws or regulations. "' This would include, for
example, a civil suit brought by a city to recover a penalty for violation
of an ordinance prohibiting the showing of lewd movies.2 0 In McColl v.
Hardin,21 a suit seeking an injunction to close the defendant's dance
hall as a nuisance because of violations of liquor laws, the opposite view
was taken. The court maintained that evidence obtained by unlawful
search and seizure was admissible, since the suit was not a criminal case,
though quasi-criminal in nature. More recent decisions considering
nuisances have held that Mapp applies to civil cases as well as criminal
ones, where state or federal officials are involved.2
An early anti-trust case, Hale v. Henkel,23 established that a cor-
-poration charged with violation of an anti-trust act is entitled to im-
imnnity under the Fourth Amendment, from such an unreasonable search
:and seizure as the compulsory production, before a grand jury,
under a subpoena duces tecum, of all records and papers of the cor-
(D.C. Wis. 1963); United States v. Four Thousand One Hundred Seventy-One Dollars
in United States Currency, 200 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. IlL. 1961).
17. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
18. 268 N.Y.S. 2d 433 (1966).
19. Accord, Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne, Inc., 262 N.Y.S. 2d
e622 (1965); But cf., Camden County Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46 F.2d 648 (D.N.J. 1930).
20. 3 IUI. App. 2d 410, 122 N.E. 2d 489 (1954), aff'd, 7 Ill. App. 2d 379, 130 NE. 2d 504
((1955). (The Court said the proceeding was quasi-criminal and the defendant could avail
1himself of the privileges of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.)
21. 70 S.W. 2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
22. E.g., Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E. 2d 384 (1965); Carlisle v. State,
276 Ala. 436, 163 S. 2d 596 (1964). (Both cases involved an attempt to abate gambling
as a public nuisance.)
23. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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poration.24 Evidence obtained by federal officials illegally has also been
excluded from treble damage action under the Emergency Price Act.2"'
In the civil deportation case of Schenck v. Ward,26 the Court held that
evidence obtained by governmental officials in violation of one's rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment is not admissible in either criminal or-
civil proceedings. 2 It has further been implied that the Fourth Amend-
ment and the exclusionary rule are applicable in tort actions.28
THE ADmISSIBILIT OF EVIDENCE UNREASONABLY
SEIZED BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
Criminal Cases
The leading case involving the question of the admissibility of evi-
dence "wrongfully" " seized by an individual in a criminal trial is
Burdeau v. McDowell.30 In that case the defendant's private papers were
taken unlawfully by a private detective and then used in a criminal
proceeding for fraudulent use of the mails. The Supreme Court held
that the Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful searches and
seizures applies only to government action. In 1961 a federal district
court in Geniviva v. Bingleir' applied this rule intact. The court stated:
The rule as to exclusion, in both federal and state courts, of evi-
dence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure in violation
of the Fourth or the Fourteenth Amendment has been broadened
and expanded since Burdeau v. McDowell. The rule, however, has
not been expanded to the extent that evidence obtained by persons
not acting in concert with either state or federal officials must be.
excluded. In this case, no constitutional rights were invaded by or
under color of official authority and in view of the principles set-
24. Accord, United States v. Wallace and Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793 (1949).
25. E.g., Bowles v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 56 F. Supp. 805 (D. Wyo. 1944); Brown
v. Glick Brothers Lumber Company, 52 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.Cal. 1943), rev'd on other
grounds, 146 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 877 (1945).
26. 24 F. Supp. 776 (D. Mass. 1938).
27. Accord, Ex porte Jackson, 263 Fed. 110 (D. Mont. 1920); but cf. United States
v. Lee Hee, 53 F.2d 681 (WD. N.Y. 1931) (dictum) (Even if illegally procured, a
confession is admissible in a deportation proceeding.)
28. Contestible v. Brookshire, 355 S.W. 2d 36 (Mo. 1962) (Wrongful death action.).
29. Supra note 4.
30. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
31. 206 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Pa. 1961). (Persons whose residence was burglarized were
not entitled to suppress as evidence items of their property taken in the burglary and_
obtained by police upon arrest of the burglars.)
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forth in Burdeau v. McDowell plaintiff's motion to suppress will
be denied. 2
Both federal and state courts that considered this question follow
Burdeau.3 3 The military courts also hold that the Constitution is a limi-
tation on the powers of government and does not proscribe individual
actions as far as the admissibility of evidence is concerned.34
The recent case of State v. RobinsoniP illustrates that the state of
the law has not changed since the Mapp decision. A New Jersey court
found that the exclusionary rule would not apply in a larceny prosecu-
tion to evidence unlawfully taken from an employee's locker in a silver
plant by the employer's security guard.
Civil Cases
Where evidence has been unreasonably seized by a private individual,
state courts have been split as to the admissibility of such evidence in
civil proceedings. Although there were few occasions to answer the
question, the case of Mercer v. Prosons6 probably best illustrates the
attitude of the majority of the courts during the period immediately
following Weeks. There, a letter was ruled admissible in a suit for aliena-
don of affection, although it had been seized by a private individual in
violation of the postal laws. The years before Mapp saw this decision
gain wide acceptance.3 7 A California court was one of the few judicial
bodies to exhibit a forward-looking philosophy when in Kohn v. Supe-
rior Court 8 it held that a husband was entitled to a writ of prohibition
restraining the court from admitting letters wrongfully taken from
32. Jd. at 83.
33. E.g., United States v. Goldberg, 330 F. 2d 30 (3rd Cit. 1964), cert. denied, 377
11.S. 953 (1964); Knoll Association v. Dixon, 232 F. Supp. 283 (D.C. N.Y. 1964);
People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied
377 U.S. 1000 (1964) (In a shoplifting case the court decided Burdeau had not been
,overruled); People v. Trimarco, 245 N.Y.S. 2d 795 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
34. United States v. Carter, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 495, 35 C.M.R. 467 (1965).
35. 86 N.J. Super. 308, 206 A. 2d 779 (1965).
36. 95 N.J.L. 224, 112 Atl. 254 (1920).
.37. E.g., Munson v. Munson, 27 Cal. 2d 659, 166 P.2d 268 (1946); State v. Lock, 302
'Mo. 400, 259 S.V. 117 (1924). In Munson, a proceeding by a husband to modify an
annulment decree to award custody of a child to him, the court admitted into evidence
a love letter written by the wife to a third person and wrongfully taken by the husband.
It must be pointed out, however, that the exclusionary rule was not even used in
criminal cases in California at the time.
38. 12 Cal. App. 2d 459, 55 P.2d 1186 (1936); cf., Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427,
93 N.W.2d 281 (1958).
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him by his estrangled wife in an action for alienation of affection. Not-
withstanding this holding, most courts prior to 1961 felt that the federal
rule respecting suppression of evidence procured by an unreasonable
search and seizure referred largely, if not exclusively, to criminal pro-
ceedings and did not apply in civil cases between individuals.39
The conflict of authority continues after Mapp, but the trend seems
to have been reversed. Two recent cases with almost identical fact
situations perfectly illustrate the wide diversity of opinion. In Sackler
v. Sackler,4° proof as to the wife's adultery was admitted in a divorce
action even though it had been obtained by means of an illegal forcible
entry into the wife's home by the husband and several private investiga-
tors employed by him. It appears that the New York courts who so
carefully avoided using the exclusionary rule in criminal cases before
Mapp are now going to retain the antiquated common law rule in civil
proceedings. On the other hand, the Superior Court of New Jersey in
Del Presto v. Del Presto4 ' found in a divorce action that evidence seized
under similar circumstances was inadmissible as a violation of the wife's
Fourth Amendment rights.
The most recent decision in this area, Williams v. Williams,42 is sound-
ly reasoned and the principles espoused by the court in that case should
be adopted when the Supreme Court renders its opinion and ultimately
resolves the problem. The Ohio court in Williams held that letters il-
legally obtained by a divorced husband from the auto of his ex-wife
were not admissible under the search and seizure provisions of the
Fourth Amendment on motion for a new trial in a divorce case
,on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The court asserted:
"Certainly no individual has a greater power than the government it-
self." '3
ARGUMENTS FOR EXTENDING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The great majority of American courts apply the exclusionary rule to
quasi-criminal and civil cases involving evidence illegally seized by state
39. Walker v. Penner, 190 Ore. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951) (Motion to suppress evidence
-an uncorked whiskey bottle-wrongfully seized in a personal injury suit arising out of
,an auto accident was denied.); accord, Kendalls v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 169, 259
S-.W. 71 (1924).
40. 255 N.Y.S. 2d 83, 203 N.E. 2d 481 (1965); but cf., Chambers v. Rosetti, 226
N.Y.S. 2d 27 (1962).
41. 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (1966).
42. 80 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E. 2d 622 (1966).
43. Id. at 626.
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or federal officials. The exclusionary rule is obviously applicable to all
the quasi-criminal cases under Weeks and Mapp. The forfeiture pro-
ceedings are subject to this rule by virtue of Boyd and One 195&
Plymouth Sedan. Evidence illegally seized by federal officials would be
inadmissible in all other cases by virtue of the rule set forth in Silver-
tborne Lumber Co. v. United States44 where the Court stated:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not
be used before the Court, but that it shall not be used at all.45
This view that evidence illegally seized by federal officials (state
officials would now be included by the Mapp decision) is not admissible
at all, certainly includes civil cases.
The question that remains is whether the Fourth Amendment applies
to actions of private individuals or merely protects the public from
unreasonable intrusions by governmental officials. The courts that re-
fuse to apply the Fourth Amendment to actions of individuals use a
circular reasoning to support their decisions. It is often asserted that
the historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the
citizens from unfettered governmental action, and that this deep-rooted
principle precludes its application to individual action. Our society will
not tolerate this rigid philosophy, nor reverence of this well-established
rule merely because of its age. The Supreme Court has also indicated
that it will not blindly adhere to this most respected limitation. In
Frank v. Maryland46 the Court stated:
While these concerns for individual rights were the historic im-
pulses behind the Fourth Amendment and its analogies in state
constitutions, the application of the Fourth Amendment and the
extent to which the essential right of privacy is protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are of course
not restricted within these historic bounds.47
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the question although some
courts construe its decision in Burdeau4s to mean it believes that the
44. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). (Contempt proceeding for failure to produce papers re-
quested on a subpoena duces tecum.)
45. Id. at 392.
46. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
47. Id. at 365-66. This idea is more fully developed in See v. Seattle, 87 S. Ct.
1737 (1967); and Camara v. San Francisco, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967).
48. Supra, note 30.
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,Constitution does not apply to individuals. 49 It must be noticed that
Burdeau was a criminal case and its circumstances were such that the
issue being discussed was not clearly outlined. There is also some au-
-thority that Elkins v. United States-5 overruled the Burdeau decision. 1
The Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule should be applied
to individual action on the basis of either one of two sound arguments.
First, the principle of "state action" 92 can be used to prevent individuals
from capitalizing on their own illegal activity. In Shelly v. Kraemer:
the Supreme Court held:
That the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official
capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth, is a proposition which has long been estab-
lished by decisions of this Court.M
The principles set forth in Shelly have been applied in cases outside
-the area of civil rights9 5 and could be adapted to include all cases in-
volving unreasonably seized evidence. Using this reasoning, a state or
federal court could not admit evidence unlawfully seized by an in-
dividual, since such admission would be an act of the state and fall under
-the rule of Mapp v. Ohio.0 A state court speaking about the case of
Potter v. BealF7 commented:
Although the court was in no manner responsible for the wrong-
ful act of taking said documents from the possession of this plain-
tiff and had done nothing regarding the production of the papers
in court, nevertheless when the nature of the documents appeared
the prohibitions contained in the Constitution were a clear limit on
the power of the court to receive said evidence or to make any
inspection thereof 4s
49. E.g., Sackler v. Sackler, 255 N.Y.S. 2d 83, 203 N.E. 2d 481 (1965); Walker v.
Penner, supra note 39.
50. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
51. Sackler v. Sackler, supra note 40. (dissent); Williams v. United States, 282 F. 2d
-940 (6th Cir. 1960) (dictum).
52. See generally, Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLvm. L. REv. 1083 (1960).
53. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
54. Id. at 14.
55. E.g., Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Railway's Employers'
Dept., AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 n.4 (1956).
56. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
57. 50 F. 860 (1st Cit. 1892).
58. Kohn v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 2d 459, 55 P.2d 1186, 1188 (1936).
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Second, the Fourth Amendment is applicable to civil cases through
its close relation to the Fifth Amendment. In Boyd v. United States,;"
Mr. Justice Bradley stated:
[The two amendments] throw light on each other. For the "un-
reasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amend-
ment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a
man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is
condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in
a criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned
in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what
is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment."
Since the Boyd ruling, it has become an established principle that the
Fifth Amendment is available in a civil proceeding.' The Supreme
Court in unequivocal terms has stated that:
[t]he government insists broadly that the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination does not apply in any civil proceeding.
The contrary must be accepted as settled. The privilege is not
ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which
the testimony is sought or is to be used.62
It has been said that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are so inter-
twined that they continuously operate together. Therefore, it is in-
congruous to say that one applies to civil proceedings not involving
governmental officials while the other does not. It has been proposed
that for this reason the Fourth Amendment should be applied only to
civil cases where the evidence seized could lead to a criminal prosecu-
tion.63 While this solution is an improvement, it is submitted that the
public be given full protection under the Fourth Amendment and
all evidence seized illegally be inadmissible in all courts."
59. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
60. Id. at 633.
61. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1922).
62. Id. at 45.
63. Note, Mapp v. Ohio and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained by Private
Parties, 72 YALE L.J. 1062, 1067-68 (1963).
64. If read literally, Mapp can be construed to stand for this proposition. The court




If it is found that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the
actions of private parties, the exclusionary rule may be still applied to
these cases by the use of a flexible rule of evidence. It has been sug-
gested that the court in determining admissibility would take into con-
sideration the nature of the crime involved in obtaining evidence."'
This is the least desirable solution, but it is adequate to prevent in-
dividuals from resorting to self-help and benefiting from an illegal act.
One of these three views must be adopted. Private searches are not
effectively deterred by existing civil and criminal sanctions."' Many
minor offenses are not prosecuted, and the money and time necessary
to bring a civil action compared to the probable recovery in these
cases discourage many from seeking this remedy. A state court has
concluded:
• . . certainly, if the Federal Government or the State of Ohio is
prohibited, under the provision of these Articles of the Federal
and State Constitutions, in using the illegally seized papers in a
Court proceeding against the individual whose property has been
seized, that an individual so seizing such property should not be
granted a greater privilege.67
CONCLUSION
The practical legal reasons given above for applying the exclusionary
rule in all cases is not outweighed by the extremely technical and some-
times dogmatic arguments favoring its use only in criminal proceedings.
The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures is to safeguard individuals' privacy. The
right of privacy was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Griswold
v. Connecticut"" where Justice Douglas in reporting the opinion of the
court pointed out that the guarantees of the first, third, fourth, fifth
and ninth amendments create a zone of privacy. The need for a legally
65. Note, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained By An Unreasonable Search in a Civil
Action, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 345 (1963). In Williams v. Williams, supra note 42 at 626,
the court lends support to the approach based on rules of evidence when it stated:
A further but less important reason seems to be that the individual stealing
property, at least as against the rights of the lawful owner, has no interest
therein, would not be able to submit these papers in evidence in a court
proceeding against the wishes of the lawful owner.
66. Comment, A Comment on the Exclusion of Evidence Wrongfully Obtained by
Private Individuals, 1966 UTAH L.R. 271 (1966).
67. Supra, note 42.
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). (A Connecticut anticontraception statute was struck down.)
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recognized right to privacy arises from the increasing and varied assaults
on the intimate thoughts and actions of individuals. Highly sophisticated
electronic devices, most competent psychological tests and numerous
ccconfidential" information forms constantly invade one's inner life. The
extension of the exclusionary rule as advocated would arrest this un-
wanted intrusion.
The right of privacy is basic to a free society and the courts should
do everything to preserve this right by utilizing the exclusionary rule,
be it based on a constitutional standard or a rule of evidence, in all cases
involving an illegal search and seizure.
Ion W. Bruce
